We examine portfolio credit quality holding and daily return patterns in a large sample of bond mutual funds and document evidence of window dressing. Using portfolio credit quality holdings data, we find that bond funds on average hold significantly more government bonds during disclosure than nondisclosure, presumably to present a safer portfolio to shareholders. Multiple index market models estimated with daily returns data corroborate these findings. We detect differences in factor loadings on days surrounding disclosure dates that indicate systematic tilting of the portfolio toward higher quality instruments. 
Introduction
contains anecdotal accounts of the practice, reliable evidence of its existence remains elusive. 2 The typical window dressing scenario entails an equity fund manager replacing recent poor performing securities with top performers around disclosure dates in an attempt to present a more attractive portfolio to investors. The rationale is that in the face of poor previous fund performance, investors are more likely to stay the course if the underlying securities are recent high-fliers. Once the portfolio holdings have been disclosed, the fund manager reverses the cosmetic rebalancing, resulting in a significantly different investment vehicle than that presented to investors.
The detrimental effects of window dressing are two-fold. Most obviously, investors are misled about the sources of fund performance. Taken to the extreme, this deception could conceal investing behavior inconsistent with the fund prospectus. This implicit cost of cosmetic rebalancing is accompanied by a second detrimental effect of window dressing: additional explicit transactions costs borne to build and dismantle cosmetic positions.
Despite the concerns voiced by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, not a single case of window dressing has been brought by the Commission against a U.S. mutual fund. This lack of action is not surprising given the difficulty in identifying portfolio activities that are solely cosmetic in nature.
The SEC currently requires mutual funds to disclose portfolio holdings twice annually. Absent voluntary disclosure, portfolio composition between disclosure periods is unavailable. Uncovering window dressing would therefore require the analysis of proprietary portfolio information on a case by case basis.
More frequent portfolio disclosure would likely reduce incentives to window dress; in the limit continual disclosure would render window dressing ineffective. However, fund advisors generally maintain that more frequent disclosure could limit their ability to profit on research analysis as the market is more quickly apprised of securities the manager feels are undervalued (perhaps before significant fund positions can be built). Such costs to shareholders might outweigh the benefits of increased disclosure, and the SEC has recently declined to require more frequent disclosure by mutual funds.
3
Despite numerous news reports and SEC interest, rigorous academic studies of window dressing are few and sometimes provide conflicting results (see section 2 for more). Moreover, the few extant studies focus only on equity and money market portfolios. In this paper, we seek to significantly expand the study of window dressing in mutual fund portfolios by examining an exhaustive sample of bond mutual funds. In doing so we provide more evidence on window dressing behavior in general, and are the first authors to directly address window dressing behavior in bond funds, a group of funds that makes up over a third of all mutual funds in the U.S.
The benefit to window dressing for bond income managers is similar to that for equity managers.
The manager can present a portfolio that does not convey the true characteristics of the portfolio. For example, the manager may hold low credit quality bonds throughout the year to increase anticipated returns and then rebalance into higher quality bonds at disclosure. The benefits are clear. The fund will be categorized by reporting services and fund investors as low risk but exhibit returns similar to higher risk funds. This mis-categorization may lead to greater fund flows and generate higher future management fees.
We examine bond fund window dressing on two fronts using different datasets and methodologies. First, we utilize a quarterly survey conducted by Morningstar that provides bond mutual fund portfolio credit quality holding data. By analyzing these data we can not only test for the existence of window dressing but also the form the window dressing behavior takes. Our analysis of portfolio composition centers on the detection of differences in the credit quality exhibited in disclosure periods versus non-disclosure periods. To the extent that window dressing occurs, we assess whether bond fund managers are increasing quality or bolstering yields at disclosure.
To augment our credit quality holding analysis, we also examine daily return patterns of bond funds. Window dressing activities should cause fund returns around disclosure periods to be driven by a different return-generating process than at other times of the year. To identify such behavior we investigate the loadings that funds have on components of a multiple-index market model. Our goal is to document whether funds appear to have different loadings on index components around disclosure periods than at other times of the year. Differences in factor loadings around disclosure periods indicate that the portfolio is temporarily tilted toward one sector of the bond market and away from another. Such differences are consistent with window dressing.
The rest of the paper is organized in four sections. We present in section 2 a review of related literature. Section 3 details the data, methodology and results of the portfolio credit quality holding analysis while section 4 treats the daily return analysis. We conclude in section 5.
Related Literature
While window dressing is widely discussed in the mutual fund industry, rigorous academic studies are limited in number and often provide conflicting results. Lakonishok, Schleifer, Thaler and Vishny (1991) find weak evidence of window dressing for equity pension funds. Pension funds appear to sell more losers in the fourth quarter than at other times of the year. However, this relative selling of losers is not accompanied by increased purchases of winners that would be consistent with theorized window dressing behavior. Since pension funds are monitored by sponsors with more sophistication than average retail investors, window dressing may be less advantageous for pension fund managers than mutual fund managers. Musto (1997 Musto ( , 1999 examines yield patterns and portfolio holdings of money market funds and finds evidence of window dressing behavior. Window dressing of money market funds would likely involve increasing the credit quality around disclosure periods to show a safer portfolio to investors.
Lending support to such cosmetic rebalancing activity, Musto (1997) finds that commercial paper that matures shortly after a calendar year-end exhibits higher yields than otherwise similar issues maturing shortly before the year-end. He attributes this difference in yields to the disutility money fund managers face by holding higher-risk securities through year-end disclosure periods. Under this explanation, yields on those issues maturing after the year-end increase as managers sell them off so as not to report those holdings to investors. In a supporting paper, Musto (1999) examines the weekly holdings of money market funds. He finds that retail money market funds tilt their allocation away from corporate securities and toward government securities around portfolio disclosures. These reallocations are more pronounced for funds with relatively poor previous-year performance. However, Musto estimates that funds reallocate on average only 0.3 percent of fund assets, an amount which may be immaterial.
Musto's findings provide some insights into how bond fund managers may behave around fiscal year-ends. The primary objective of money fund investors is the preservation of principal. Yield is likely a secondary objective and capital appreciation not a consideration at all. Therefore, it is not surprising that money fund managers endeavor to present an extremely safe portfolio of securities at disclosure. At the other extreme, equity fund managers serve shareholders expecting primarily capital appreciation. As such, theories on window dressing have suggested that equity managers would load up on previous highflying stocks. In terms of aggressiveness, bond funds fall between money funds and equity funds and as such it is difficult to determine if presenting a safer portfolio or one that bolsters the perceived yield would be preferred by investors and hence managers.
In addition to the studies above, several other papers have examined window dressing to explain the January effect in equity portfolios. Indeed, the first paper to really explore window dressing behavior, Haugen and Lakonishok (1988) , proposed that large-scale trading out of losers and into winners before the turn of the year and subsequent reversal of these trades might drive equity markets to exhibit return patterns consistent with the observed January effect. However, several follow up studies, (Sias and Starks (1997) , Lee, Porter and Weaver (1998) ), find that the January effect exhibited by previous losers is mainly concentrated in stocks with greater individual rather than institutional ownership. This finding casts some doubt on institutional portfolio window dressing as a cause of the January effect.
Although less well-known, the January effect has also been documented for bond markets (see for example Maxwell (1998) and Fridson (2000) ). Maxwell (1998) looks at window dressing of fixed income portfolios as potential causes of the effect. He examines the liquid assets of bond mutual funds across year-ends to gauge aggregate shifts in demand for liquid assets versus less liquid debt instruments that might explain heightened debt returns in January. He finds no evidence that such portfolio rebalancing takes place and therefore concludes that there is no role for window dressing in explaining the bond market January effect. Fridson (2000) , in a separate analysis, also finds that window dressing behavior does not explain the January effect in bond markets.
In summary, studies of window dressing have produced mixed results. Retail money funds appear to move into higher quality issues around disclosure periods, but the economic significance of the phenomenon is debatable. Equity pension funds appear to sell relatively more losers in the fourth quarter but do not exhibit corresponding increases in demand for winners. Window dressing does not appear to drive the January effect in the equity or fixed income markets. None of these prior studies have specifically looked at whether window dressing exists for institutional fixed income portfolios. The following analysis fills this void.
Credit Analysis Data
In this section we analyze the portfolio credit quality of a large sample of bond funds. Our data allow us to segregate our portfolio composition observations into those periods in which a fund has an official SEC disclosure and those that do not. Differences in disclosure and non-disclosure holdings are then examined in several ways to uncover systematic portfolio composition changes that may be consistent with window dressing. Due to the importance of these data in this study, we present a detailed description of the data collection process below.
The Morningstar Data
The portfolio credit quality holding data are drawn from the Morningstar quarterly data disks. The The fact that the data are based on a survey raises several issues. First, the frequency and the consistency of the disclosure of the data are not constant. While a vast majority of the bond funds report the credit analysis data once or twice a year, a small minority report every quarter and an even smaller minority only report once every couple of years. Therefore we do not have data for each quarter for every bond fund. Nevertheless we are exhaustive in our use of the Morningstar data using every unique data point that we can find in our sample range.
Second, there is no way to verify whether the information provided to Morningstar by the funds is accurate. Indeed, one might expect to find no window dressing behavior in this sample as the funds may report holdings information to Morningstar that only shows them in a positive light. As such, our use of these data should provide a conservative test of the existence of window dressing in our sample since reporting selection bias may be an issue. 
Collection of the Data
Our objective in collecting the data was to include as many observations points as possible. However, due to the fact that the credit analysis data are not consistently updated, we collected the data in the following manner. First, we used 13 quarterly Morningstar data disks (March 1998 -March 2001 We then narrowed our sample of credit analysis data points in the following five ways:
1) For each disk of data, we eliminated all replicate credit analysis data points that were caused by multiple share classes. We did this to avoid a fund being counted more than once per disk.
2) We eliminated all credit analysis data points which were listed on earlier disks used in our sample selection process. For example, since many funds only update their credit analysis data once or twice a year, the same credit analysis data could appear on consecutive quarterly disks. To avoid counting the same data points more than once we eliminated these overlapping data points.
3) We eliminated any credit analysis data points that contained missing data.
4)
We eliminated all credit analysis data points for funds that did not have a fiscal year-end provided by Morningstar.
5)
We eliminated all credit analysis data points from index funds. Index funds are constrained in their holdings by the index and hence are not likely to engage in window dressing.
After these adjustments, the sample consisted of every unique non-index, corporate bond credit analysis data point that existed on the March 1998 to March 2001 Morningstar disks that had fiscal year-end information. This procedure yielded 3,170 credit analysis data points. The next step in analysis was to define each of the 3,170 credit analysis data points as a disclosure or nondisclosure data point. Since the SEC requires that funds disclose their holdings on their fiscal year end and then six months after this time, a disclosure data point is one where the date of the credit analysis data coincides with one of these two dates. All other credit analysis data points are non-disclosure data points.
For example, consider a fund with a credit analysis data point of December 31, 1998. If the fund had a fiscal year-end of December or June, then that credit analysis data point would have been considered a disclosure data point. If the fund had any other fiscal year-end, the credit analysis data point would have been considered a non-disclosure data point.
In our sample we found 804 disclosure data points which represent 25 percent of the sample.
observations take place at the month ends of March, June, September and December, with the data points being spread relatively evenly among the four quarters. More specifically, December had the most observations with 259 followed by June (247), March (148) and September (141). For the non-disclosure data points there were a total of 2,366 data points with December again having the most with 643 followed by March (567), June (524), September (524) and 108 data points that were not on the quarter end. 
Methodology
Using the data described above we first use very straightforward methodology to examine whether the quality of the bond holdings differed between disclosure and nondisclosure periods. For this portion of the analysis, we estimated the following equation: There were a limited number of data points where the credit analysis data were not given on a quarter end. We included these observations to be as inclusive as possible. However, the vast majority of the disclosure (99 percent-795 of 804) and non-disclosure (96 percent-2258 of 2366) data points were on quarter ends. We adjust for the inclusion of these data by including a dummy variable for observations not on the quarter end.
=
A dummy variable coded 1 if the credit analysis data point came in 1998, 0 otherwise,
A dummy variable coded 1 if the credit analysis data point came in 1999, 0 otherwise, GeneralStyle = A dummy variable coded 1 if the credit analysis data point was a corporate bond general fund, 0 otherwise, Disclosure = A dummy variable coded 1 if the credit analysis data point is a disclosure datapoint, 0 if a non-disclosure data point, i = 1 through N, where N is the total number of credit analysis data points in the sample.
The time and style dummies are to control for these effects in the equation. The reference group for equation (1) consists of the March, 2000, corporate high-quality, non-disclosure credit analysis data points.
For equation (1) we examined two sets of dependent variables. For the first set we use four broad measures of bond quality held by the fund. These were the percentage of holdings in Government bonds, Investment Grade Corporate bonds (corporate bonds with AAA-to BBB-ratings), Non-Investment Grade corporate bonds (corporate bonds with BB-to Sub-B-ratings) and the percentage holdings in bonds that were listed as not rated/not available (NA/NR). The second set of dependent variables were the nine specific measures of bond quality used by Morningstar, i.e., the percentage of holdings in Government, AAA-, AA-, A-, BBB-, BB-, B-, Sub-B, and NA/NR-rated bonds.
Results
The results of equation (1) using the four broad dependent variables are presented in Tables 1A-C. Table   1A shows the results for the full sample, while Table 1B presents the results using a sample of only general bond funds, and Table 1C shows the results with a sample of only high-quality bond funds (as described in the section 2 we sample all corporate bond funds, which were subdivided by Morningstar into general and high-quality samples). Tables 2A-C show the results of equation (1) using the nine specific dependent variables for the three samples (full, general and high-quality).
Since all the independent variables are dummy variables, the interpretation of the coefficient values is the percentage of assets held in the specific bond rating category. For example, the coefficient for disclosure in the first column (percent of assets held in Government bonds) of Table 1A is 3.51. This signifies that after controlling for time and style effects, the average bond fund in our sample held 3.51 percent more government bonds at disclosure than during non-disclosure periods.
The Tables shows several interesting findings. First and most important, funds hold significantly more government bonds during disclosure than non-disclosure. For the full sample ( Table 1A ) we find that funds allocate 3.51 percent more to government bonds during disclosure periods than non-disclosure periods. This result supports the notion that bond funds window dress their funds at disclosure by adding safe government bonds to their portfolios and dumping other types of bonds. Intuitively, we would expect that this shift towards higher quality holdings at disclosure to be stronger in high-quality bond funds as these funds would attempt to showcase portfolios consistent with their prospectuses. Consistent with this intuition, we find that the increase in government holdings is stronger for high-quality funds (4.99 percent) than general funds (2.68 percent).
Second, our results indicate that investment grade corporate bonds are dumped by funds at disclosure. For the full sample ( Table 1A ) we see that funds hold 4.02 percent less investment grade corporate bonds during disclosure. We again find this effect is stronger in the high-quality bond fund group as high-quality bond funds held 4.50 percent less investment grade corporate at disclosure while general bond funds held 3.69 percent less of these bonds at disclosure. In Tables 2A-C we see that this movement out of investment grade bonds is largely in the AAA class as only this class of bonds shows a significantly negative coefficient.
Third, we find some evidence (albeit weak) that funds are holding more non-investment grade corporate bonds during disclosure. As shown on Table 1A , when using the non-investment grade bond holdings as the dependent variable, the coefficient for disclosure is positive (although quite small) and significant at the five percent level. This being said, the result does not hold up in sub-samples of Table   1B -C nor do they really show up much in Tables 2A-C . Hence, the result might just be an artifact of the large sample that we have in Table 1A . Moreover, even if the result found in Table 1A holds, the magnitude of the effect is rather small (0.79) when compared to what happens to the holdings of government and investment grade bonds at disclosure.
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In summary, the results of Tables 1-2 are strongly indicative that window dressing is being practiced. We find clear evidence that funds are holding more government bond funds during disclosure and significantly fewer investment grade bonds (particularly AAA-rated bonds). These results suggest that funds are replacing investment grade corporate bonds with government bonds at disclosure in a move to increase perceived quality of holdings. We find this movement is especially the case for high-quality bond funds. Such results are very consistent with intuition as these high-quality funds must live up to their name by showing that they hold significant percentages of high-quality bonds.
11 10 The adjusted R-squared values in Tables 1-2 can be partially explained by the fact that equation (1) only uses dummy variables as independent variables. Nevertheless, to try to combat this problem, we used quarterly yields and credit spreads as additional explanatory variables in equation (1). We used the Treasury yield, corporate yield spread separately and together in the regressions and found that the results were again very similar to those in Tables 1-2 and that the additional variables added little explanatory power.
11 In addition to equation (1) we also ran a fixed effects model where all quarters (except a reference quarter group) were represented by dummy variables. The results of this analysis were qualitatively the same as those shown in Tables 1-2 . These results are available upon request.
Credit Analysis Pairs Test
As a robustness check, we examined whether window dressing was evident by tracing a specific fund's credit analysis data points over time. The basic idea was to find a fund's credit analysis on a disclosure date and then pair that data point with the fund's quarterly adjacent non-disclosure credit analysis data point. By having disclosure and non-disclosure data points that were just one quarter apart we could examine if our results reported in Tables 1-2 generally held as we examined funds over time. This section describes this analysis.
As mentioned in section 2, the portfolio credit quality holding data from Morningstar is not updated every quarter for every fund. Some funds update once a year while others update more or less frequently. In light of these data difficulties we were forced to use a relatively complex method of acquiring data for these data.
For this test we gathered the data in a slightly different manner than the previous tests. For each Morningstar data disk from March 1998 to December 2000 (12 total disks) we collected corporate bond funds (both general and high quality) that had fiscal year-ends of March, June, September and December (as opposed to all funds, regardless of the time of the fiscal year end, in the previous sample). Our rationale for choosing these funds was that Morningstar's portfolio composition surveys are conducted on a quarterly basis (March, June, September, and December). As a result, by selecting funds with these fiscal year-ends we were likely to have the composition data on disclosure dates and on non-disclosure dates. For other funds, the composition data would always occur on non-disclosure dates.
After narrowing the sample down by selecting funds with these fiscal year-ends, we then reduced the sample by excluding funds that were simply replicates of other funds in the sample, i.e., class B, C shares, etc. Also, if a fund did not have credit analysis data, it was eliminated.
Finally, with the resulting sample of funds, we examined each fund to see if it survived to the next quarter by examining the next quarter's disk. So for the March 1998 sample we examined the June 1998 disk. If we found that the fund had survived, we then evaluated whether the fund's credit analysis data had been updated for the next quarter. 12 If we found that the credit analysis data had been updated, then the credit analysis data found from the earlier disk and the credit analysis data taken from the later disk were put together to form a "credit analysis pair." 13 Since the credit analysis data are updated by 12 Note that since the disks are only one quarter apart, the vast majority of funds survive from one disk to the other. It should be noted, however, that there were a significant number of funds that changed their name from one quarter to the another. We made every attempt to include all funds that survived regardless of whether their names changed between quarters or not. 13 To better understand this complicated data extraction process, consider an example. The Calvert Income Fund was a fund that met our criteria on the March 1998 disk. The fund was classified as Corporate Bond-General fund and had a fiscal year-end of September, meaning that it disclosed its portfolio holdings to the SEC at the end of Morningstar on a quarterly basis and because we examined funds with fiscal year-ends of March, June, September and December, each "credit analysis pair" was composed of a fund's credit analysis data on a disclosure date and on an adjacent non-disclosure date.
14 The results of the tests are presented in Table 3. The table shows 24 different samples of credit analysis pairs. We show 12 samples where the disclosure data point precedes the non-disclosure data point and 12 samples where the disclosure data point follows the non-disclosure data point. In the table we show the average difference between the disclosure holdings and the non-disclosure holdings for each sample of credit analysis pairs. We use four quality categories: Government, Investment Grade
Corporates (AAA-BBB rated), Non-Investment Grade Corporates (BB-Below B rated), and unrated bonds (NA/NR). Since the non-disclosure percentage holdings are always subtracted from the disclosure percentage holdings, positive (negative) numbers always indicate that the percentage of bonds held were higher (lower) during the disclosure period than the non-disclosure period.
Due to the lack of data, for some of the 24 samples there are only a few credit analysis pairs.
Hence, it is difficult to identify many statistically significant findings in the Table. However, the signs on the average differences do give us some limited support for the results reported in Tables 1-2 . We find that, in a majority of the 24 samples, more government and less investment grade corporate bonds are held at disclosure. We also find that in a majority of the samples show that more non-investment grade bonds were held at disclosure (although only one of these samples showed a significant difference).
September and March. On the March 1998 disk, this fund had credit analysis data dated 12-31-97 (typically the credit quality holding information lags the data disk by one quarter). Using the June 1998 disk we found that the fund had survived to the next quarter and had credit analysis data listed for next quarter, dated 3-31-98. Since the Calvert Income A had a September fiscal year-end, the 12-31-97 credit analysis data point constituted a nondisclosure date, and the 3-31-98 credit analysis data point represented a disclosure date. Hence, taken together, these two credit analysis data points made up a credit analysis pair.
14 Note that after identifying all the credit analysis pairs in the Morningstar disks, we then narrowed the sample of credit analysis pairs in four ways. First, we excluded credit analysis pairs for which the fund merged into another fund between quarters. Our rationale for eliminating these pairs was that changes in these fund's composition data could be due to the merger and not the result of window dressing. Second, we excluded credit analysis pairs that had data points whose holdings did not add up to 100 percent. As stated before, Morningstar's credit analysis data show the percentage of fixed-income securities that fall within each credit quality rating as assigned by Standard and Poor's or Moody's. Moreover, they show the percentage of funds that are not rated or not available to be rated. These percentages should add up to 100 percent; however, in a very few cases they differ substantially from 100 percent. Since our tests of window dressing are based on the changes in the composition of the fund between the disclosure and non-disclosure periods, such deviations could obviously lead to misleading results and consequently these pairs were eliminated. Third, we excluded all credit analysis pairs of index funds (consistent with our previous analysis). Fourth, we excluded any credit analysis pair in which the credit analysis data points were not exactly one quarter apart or did not fall on the exact quarter ends. We did this to insure that our test is sensitive to the time of the credit analysis report.
Daily Return Analysis
A difficulty we face in attempting to uncover window dressing in the previous analysis is that it is likely that only a subset of fund managers practice window dressing. Therefore the effects that we attempt to detect by analyzing average holdings across the sample of all bond funds are diluted. If only 1 in 10 fund mangers is window dressing, the effect in our sample will be only one tenth as strong as the actual rebalancing occurring in the single window-dressed portfolio.
In this section of the paper, we examine the daily return patterns of funds to detect changes in the return-generating process consistent with window-dressing. We perform this analysis on a fund-by-fund basis and, because we have many daily observations per fund, can detect, with some statistical reliability, that window dressing that may be occurring in only a few funds in the sample.
Essentially, we investigate the loadings that funds have on components of a dual-index market 
Daily Return Calculation and Distributions
Bond mutual funds adopt one of several different methods for reporting net asset values and distributions. 16 The most straightforward method, because it parallels the method for equity funds, entails adjusting the NAV down on the day of any distribution by the amount of the distribution. This method also intuitively matches how we expect stock prices to adjust at the ex-dividend date. However, most bond funds do not account for distributions in this manner. Most bond funds treat income and capital gains distributions differently. While capital gains distributions generally are accompanied by an equivalent reduction in NAV, income distributions are most often treated just as accrued interest is treated with bonds. The NAV of the fund is quoted without the accrued interest, but a fund redeemer is entitled to the NAV plus the accrued interest of the fund. When an income distribution is made, it has no effect on the NAV.
These different reporting conventions significantly complicate the calculation of daily fund returns on days where funds pay distributions. The correct treatment of distributions requires knowledge of a fund's accounting method and, in many cases, the percentage of the distribution that is income versus capital gains. We have neither in our dataset. For this reason, we eliminate all days on which a distribution is paid on the funds in our sample.
The lack of information on accrued interest means that technically we cannot calculate total daily returns. The actual total daily return would include changes in the NAV of the fund plus any interest that accrues on that day. We can, however, calculate a price return for each day. Price returns are thus calculated from this data as:
PRET i,t = (NAV i,t -NAV i,t-1 )/ NAV i,t-1 ,
where, PRET i,t = daily price return for fund i on day t, NAV i,t = net asset value of fund i at close of day t.
Daily price returns are calculated for each fund on each day over the period January 1, 1994 through September 30, 2001. A fund that exists throughout the sample period will have 83 months of return data.
For eight funds we were unable to find daily return data, reducing our sample of funds to 295. Table 4 presents details of the sample with respect to the types of funds and the fiscal year-ends of the funds. We note that the most popular reporting schedule is June and December. However, 70 percent of the sample reports in months other than these.
17 16 The details in this subsection were identified in the data and verified through independent discussions with employees of the Investment Company Institute 17 Carhart, Kaniel, Musto and Reed (2001) find evidence that equity fund managers engage in trading that temporarily inflates NAVs on the last day of the year. Such behavior, if systematically employed in bond portfolios, might influence our findings. However, given that 70 percent of our sample has non-December reporting periods, we doubt that such an effect drives our subsequent results.
A small number of missing observations are evident in the data. For a subset of these missing observations, we cross-checked these missing observations with data from "Yahoo!". In all of the cases checked, Yahoo! was also missing those same observations, suggesting it was the original source of data that was lacking these observations. For each of the missing observations, returns on that day and the day following cannot be calculated. In all, 0.33 percent of all observations of fund returns cannot be calculated because of missing data. Additionally, we drop 2.1 percent of all return observations due to reported distributions.
Market Model Methodology and Results
We relate the daily price returns to our sample of mutual funds to yield changes on government and corporate bonds. For the government bond sector we use the yield on 10-year treasuries. For the corporate sector we use the Moody's baa yield (which is equivalent to BBB used in section 3). 18 The market model is shown below in equation two.
where,
Return i,t = Return to fund i on day t, Yt10 t = percentage change in the yield on 10-year treasuries on day t, Ybaa t = percentage change in yield on Moody's baa corporate bond index on day t.
The model does not appear to be well-specified for some funds in the sample, as indicated by low R-squares in several of the individual fund regressions. Out of the sample of 295 bond funds, 135 have R-squares greater than .80. An additional 65 exhibit R-squares between .70 and .80. Twenty four display R-squares between .60 and .70 while the remaining 71 funds have R-squares less than .60. For the next step in our analysis, we delete the 71 funds in the sample that do not exhibit an R-square of at least 60 percent for the market model.
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With the sample limited to those funds for which our market model is well-specified, we develop an augmented market model regression to detect differences in index factor loadings for funds around disclosure periods. The augmented market model is shown below in equation (4). 18 We find similar results to those reported when using Moody's Aaa bond yields (which is equivalent to the AAA grade in section 3). 19 We suspect that the low R-squares are likely the result of errors in the data. We specify several screens to attempt to filter out erroneous returns and deleted these observations from the sample before estimating the market models. 
where, RPDum = 1 if day t is within 5 days of the end of the fund's fiscal year or half-year end, 0 otherwise.
On most days of the year, RPDum will be zero. On the ten days immediately surrounding reporting periods, RPDum will be one. 20 The interpretation of the interaction terms is that they represent the average incremental difference in loading on the indexes around reporting periods. Since the β1 coefficient is negative, (price returns are inversely correlated with bond yield changes), a negative and significant β3 coefficient indicates heightened sensitivity to the yield changes in the government bond market at disclosure. Similarly, since the β2 is also negative, a negative and significant β4 coefficient indicates heightened exposure to the corporate bond market at disclosure. Positive and significant coefficients for β3 or β4 would indicate less sensitivity to yield changes in government or corporate bonds at disclosure.
To illustrate further, consider an example where we find window dressing behavior consistent with that shown in section 3 (more government bonds and fewer corporate bonds are held at disclosure).
We would expect to find a negative and significant β3 indicating heightened sensitivity to the yield changes in the government bond market at disclosure. This change would be accompanied by a positive and significant β4 indicating reduced exposure to the corporate bond market.
Our procedure is to run the model in equation (4) for each of the 224 funds in the sample that appear well specified by our dual-index market model. We undertake this portion of the analysis separately for corporate-general and corporate-high-quality funds. Tabulations of the numbers of funds with significant interaction coefficients and their signs are presented in Tables 5 (general-quality funds) and 6 (high-quality funds). Each table has three panels that subdivide the sample on the degree of fit of the market model.
First consider the general funds in Table 5 . Of the 148 funds shown in Panel A, 12.2 percent (18 funds) exhibit β3 coefficients that are negative and significantly different from zero at the five percent level. Almost seven percent (10 funds) have significant β4 coefficients at the five percent level. Of course, statistically we would expect that in a sample of 148 funds, 2.5 percent (between three and four funds) would show negative and significant coefficient at the five percent level even in the absence of any true relationship between the funds' returns and the interacted variable. Consequently, we measure whether the percentage observed is statistically different than the alpha-level significance threshold by specifying a binomial probability test. The test measures the probability of observing a certain percentage of significant coefficients given that we expect the alpha-level percentage of funds to display a by-chance sensitivity to the interacted variable. For example, in the case of the β3 coefficient in the first row of Panel A, the binomial test will measure the likelihood of observing a negative and significant coefficient for 12.2 percent of the sample under the null that 2.5 percent will display a negative and significant coefficient even in the absence of any true differential sensitivity to the government index around reporting periods. The binomial probability for observing exactly y significant coefficients is shown in equation (5): 5) where, p(y) = the probability of observing exactly y significant coefficients, n = the total number of funds for which the market model is run, p = the alpha level of significance for identifying funds that are differentially sensitive to the given index, q = (1-p).
To generate a test statistic, we must calculate p(y) for each number of funds less than the observed number of significant coefficients and sum these probabilities. Subtracting this sum from one gives us the p-value on our test. For example, the probability of observing 18 or more significant β3 coefficients is {1-[p(1)+p(2) + p(3) + … + p(17)]}. Table 5 (Panels A-C), column 2, shows that percentage of funds identified is highly statistically different from the alpha-level for the coefficient β3. We conclude that the significant coefficients strongly suggest that some funds have reliably different sensitivities to the government bond index around reporting periods.
The third and fourth columns of Table 5 document the percentages of the β3 coefficients that are positively and negatively significant respectively. 21 While we find that the number of positively and negatively significant β3 coefficients is statistically greater than that expected by chance, we find that the percentage of funds with negative and significant β3 coefficients is much larger than the percentage of funds with positive and significant β3 coefficients. Hence, the evidence here suggests that while some funds are reducing their government exposure (a positive β3 coefficient), more funds appear to be increasing their government bond exposure (a negative β3 coefficient) around the disclosure time period.
This result is consistent with what our credit analysis results in Tables 1 and 2. The fourth, fifth and six columns of Table 5 show the results for the β4 coefficients which signal altered exposure to corporate bonds around disclosure periods. Again, we find that both the number of positive and negative coefficients that are significant is far greater than we would expect by chance.
However, unlike the β3 coefficient results, we find that the β4 results are more evenly split between funds that increase (a positive β4 coefficient) and funds that decrease (a negative β4 coefficient) their corporate bond exposure surrounding disclosure. Hence, unlike Tables 1-2 , it is not as clear that funds are moving out of corporate bonds during disclosure.
22
Perhaps a stronger test of window dressing would be to document those funds that display both β3 and β4 coefficients that are significant and of opposite signs. In every single case of a negative and significant β3, the β4 coefficient was of the opposite sign, but not necessarily significant at traditional levels. Of the 148 funds in the general bond fund sample (Panel A), eight display negative and significant β3 coefficients and positive and significant β4 coefficients consistent with a quality-increasing strategy.
If we assume that there is no altered sensitivity to these indexes around reporting periods, we would expect by chance to find both β3 and β4 coefficients significant at the five percent level in only (.05) 2 =
.25 percent of all funds. We find it in approximately 5.4 percent of funds. 23 Three of the eight funds have reporting periods in June and December, two report in April and October, one each report in March and September, January/July and February/August. These results suggest that specific reporting months are not driving the findings. Table 6 (panels A-C) presents the results for the sample of high-quality bond funds. As with the general funds, we find that the percentage of funds with negative and significant β3 coefficients is much larger than the percentage of funds with positive and significant β3 coefficients (see columns three and four). For the β4 coefficients we find results that are consistent with funds moving out of corporate bonds during disclosure. Specifically we find in all the panels that the number of positive and significant β4
22 As a robustness check, we estimated equation (4) with a modified dependent variable. Instead of estimating the model with the raw price returns for each fund as the dependent variable, we formed a long-short portfolio for each fund in the sample and used this portfolio as the dependent variable. The long-short portfolio is long on the fund and short on an equally-weighted portfolio of all funds in the sample that do not have the same reporting period schedule as the fund. The idea behind this construction is to control for systematic changes in the bond market that may be affecting all funds and not just the fund in question. The results are qualitatively similar to the reported results in Tables 5-6 . For example, we find 31 of 148 long-short portfolios (20.9 percent) with β3 coefficients significant at the five percent level. About twelve percent were negative and significant and 8.8 percent were positive and significant. A total of 18 funds display β3 and β4 coefficients that are both significant at the five percent level and show the opposite sign. 23 If we limit the sample to only those funds with market model R-squares greater than .8, we find five funds (5.7 percent) with both coefficients significant.
coefficients (indicating reduced exposure to corporate bond during disclosure) is higher than the number of negative and significant coefficients (see columns 6 and 7).
Our findings for these high-quality bond funds are intuitively appealing in that we would expect that high-quality funds would be much more likely to attempt to increase their perceived quality around disclosure periods as compared to general funds since the high-quality funds would be forced by their prospectuses to show such holdings. The results also corroborate our findings from the Morningstar data, in which we found that high-quality bond funds increased (decreased) their holding of government bonds (investment grade corporate bonds) more than general bond funds.
Conclusion
This paper represents the first direct investigation of the degree to which window dressing behavior exists in bond mutual funds. Using two unique data sets we find significant evidence of behavior consistent with window dressing. Specifically, after controlling for time and style effects, we find that bond funds hold significantly more government bonds at disclosure as compared to non-disclosure. Furthermore, we find that bond funds hold significantly fewer investment grade corporate bonds at disclosure than at nondisclosure. Similar to Musto (1999) , we suspect that this behavior is an effort to increase the perceived quality of the holdings of the funds at disclosure.
Our findings clearly have regulatory implications. Investors in bond funds may bear implicit and explicit costs due to window dressing. However, from an enforcement perspective there has heretofore been significant difficulty in identifying those funds that are engaging in such activities. Our daily returns methodology in section 4 suggests a mechanism for identifying funds with return patterns consistent with window dressing. Using daily returns and well-specified market models, regulators can screen the universe of funds to isolate a manageable sample of funds that appears most likely to be cosmetically managing their portfolios on the disclosure dates. reports the percentage of reporting-period interaction coefficients that are significant at various levels for a sample of general bond funds. Initially, the return series for each fund is employed in the two factor market model in equation (3) below. For all funds that exhibit an R-square in the regression greater than, successively, .60, .70, and .80, the model in equation (4) is estimated. The coefficients on the bond market interactive variables are collected and the percentage that are significant at three traditional levels are tabulated. These percentages are shown in the second and fifth columns in the table. The percentage of coefficients that are positive and significant and that are negative and significant are also tabulated. Asterisks and pound signs denote those percentages that are statistically significantly greater than the alpha-level in column one. ### -p-value on test of difference between percentage significant and (alpha-level/2) < .001 ## -p-value on test of difference between percentage significant and (alpha-level/2) < .005 # -p-value on test of difference between percentage significant and (alpha-level/2) < .01 Table 6 : Significance of reporting-period interaction coefficients for high-quality bond funds Table reports the percentage of reporting-period interaction coefficients that are significant at various levels for a sample of high-quality bond funds. Initially, the return series for each fund is employed in the two factor market model in equation (3) below. For all funds that exhibit an R-square in the regression greater than, successively, .60, .70, and .80, the model in equation (4) is estimated. The coefficients on the bond market interactive variables are collected and the percentage that are significant at three traditional levels are tabulated. These percentages are shown in the second and fifth columns in the table. The percentage of coefficients that are positive and significant and that are negative and significant are also tabulated. Asterisks and pound signs denote those percentages that are statistically significantly greater than the alpha-level in column one. 
